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ABSTRACT 
The Doha Declaration has included environment for the first time in its 
agenda. Environment is considered one of the critical areas for the new Round and a 
significant step in clarifying the much-debated relationship between the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). 
Yet the treatment of environment is one of the least satisfactory aspects of the Doha 
declaration. The mandate is narrow in scope and lacks clarity, which is likely to lead 
to a stand off in regard to Article XX. It also excludes the most important and most 
difficult issue, namely the handling in the WTO of a situation in which a non-party 
of a MEA challenges a trade-related measure taken pursuant to that MEA by one of 
its members. 
This paper examines this mandate by first exploring the relationship between 
the WTO and MEAs arguing that there is a real potential for conflict due to the 
increasing amount of MEAs that use trade measures. It points out that WTO 
jurisprudence, and international law currently does not provide any clarity for the 
WTO/MEA relationship. There are real concerns that a conflict resolved under the 
WTO regime, would provide a result in favour of trade rather than the environment. 
The paper then argues that the mandate is not sufficient to provide the 
certainty required for all the aspects of the MEA/WTO relationship and suggests that 
the answers may be found outside the WTO forum. It proposes that a global 
environment organisation would be the ideal way to resolve the situation, but 
acknowledges that this is not a practical as it in itself presents issues of its own. In 
conclusion this paper proposes a Declaration or Understanding that will provide the 
clarity and certainty at this time. 
Word Length: 11687 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The growing tension between trade liberalisation and environmental 
protection has accelerated within the last decade. One of the critical issues 
contributing to this tension is the relationship between international trade rules in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the international environmental rules in the 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). 
MEAs are increasingly being used to address transboundary environmental 
and health problems, which are linked to international trade and other economic 
activities. There are concerns that a number of MEAs contain trade measures that 
are inconsistent with the rules of the WTO. This could cause a conflict, which may 
be challenged in the WTO. There are concerns that MEAs could be treated similarly 
to unilateral environmental measures, which have all been ruled against in favour of 
the trade outcomes. 
The relationship between these two bodies of law is fu II of uncertainty and it 
is not known what will happen if measures taken in accordance with an MEA do 
violate a governments obligations under the WTO or which body of law the disputes 
would be resolved under. This relationship has become a source of confusion and 
conflict for governments that have accepted the multilaterally agreed rules of the 
WTO but which at the same time have subscribed to MEAs whose compatibility 
with the WTO may be doubtful. 
The Committee of Trade and Environment (CTE) since its formation have 
actively taken up the task of discussing this relationship but until recently they have 
not taken any action. The new Doha Round of negotiations has presented a new 
opportunity for exploring this relationship by including environment for the first 
time on its agenda. However, the treatment of environment under the mandate is one 
of the least satisfactory aspects of the Doha declaration. The mandate has proved to 
be very narrow in scope and lacks clarity in critical areas. Jt excludes the most 
difficult issue, namely the handling in the WTO of a situation in which a non-party 
of a MEA challenges a trade-related measure taken pursuant to that MEA by one of 
5 
its members. It also envisages negotiations purely within the WTO, which restricts 
any solutions, if needed to the WTO rules themselves. This leaves out the potential 
to consider the MEA provisions or any other possible sources of difficulty between 
these two bodies of law. 
In order to examine this relationship the first part of this paper will set out 
the structural difference between international trade (GATT/WTO) and 
environmental (MEAs) frameworks. It will then discuss whether there are provisions 
contained within MEAs that are incompatible with existing WTO rules and whether 
there is potential for conflict in the future between MEAs and the WTO. The second 
part of this paper will then examine the paragraphs within the Doha mandate that are 
critical to the WTO/MEA relationship and explore the definitions and scope for 
change. Finally, this paper presents a series of options that have been purported by 
different countries and organisations and proposes that a more global and/or 
principled approach would be more effective m resolving the WTO/MEA 
relationship if there is to be further progress. 
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II GATTI WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT) was established m 
1947 to increase the standards of living and expand production by promoting free 
trade among its members, reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade.
1 
Th is trading 
regime is based on the economic theory of comparative advantage, which purports 
that the world economy can achieve greater economic efficiency through trade 
liberalisation .2 Nations that are able to rely on an open market will specialise in the 
production of goods they are best adapted to produce. This specialisation increases 
efficiency by decreasing costs.3 
GATT Article I, III an XI are the three core conditions that limit the ways in 
which nations may impose restrictions on products subject to the exceptions of 
GATT Article XX. 4 These three core conditions are based on the principle of non-
discrimination, which means that members are not allowed to treat goods from one 
country differently than those from another within the regime, and they are not 
allowed to impose restrictions on imports of goods that are not restricted 
domestically.5 In addition, to the extent that members do impose restrictions on free 
trade, these should be in the form of tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers such as 
quotas or prohibitions, and they should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
6 
1 T Alana Deere " Balancing Free Trade and the Environment: A Proposed Interpretation of GATr 
Article XX's Preamble" ( 1998) I O lnt' l Legal Per p 1.4. 
2 D M McRae "Trade and the Environment: The Development of WTO Law" ( 1998) 9 Otago L Rev 
221 , 223. 
3 David Ricardo developed the theory of Comparative Advantage in the eighteenth century. 
4 GA TT art XX. 
5 J 11 Jackson "World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?" ( 1992) 49 
Washington and Lee L Rev 1227, 1228. 
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Article I- Most Favoured-Nation Treatment 
The most-favoured nation (MFN) clause is the key rule to ensuring continued global 
tariff reduction. It requires equal treatment among WTO signatories with two 
exceptions: regional trade agreements and special treatment for developing 
countries.7 For example, Article I would preclude a WTO member from imposing a 
20% tariff on party A's widgets and only a 10% tariff on party B's widgets. The 
MFN principle would require that the preferential 10% tariff be extended to party A. 
Article III- National Treatment 
National treatment requires imported products to be treated no less favourably than 
"like" domestic products. (The term "like" products is generally considered to refer 
to two goods that compete against each other in the market as substitutes).
8 
For 
example a Party could not require imported widgets to have a safety function and 
not require the same from its domestic widget manufactures. 
Article XI- Quantitative Restrictions 
This article prohibits quotas, import or export licences. The WTO bans these tactics 
because they distort trade more than tariffs, and are prohibited other than for specific 
exemptions defined by the WTO. 
B The World Trade Organisation 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established on January l, 1995, 
as a result of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations ( 1987-1994).
9 It incorporated 
the GA TT's free trade policies including the binding dispute-settlement 
6 Ministry for the Environment Trade and the Environment: The Risks and Opportunities for New 
Zealand Associated with the Relationship between the WI'O and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Discussion Document (Wellington, 200 I) . 
7 Thomas J Schoenbawn" International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The continuing 
search for reconciliation" ( 1997) 91 A.J .l.L 268, 271. 
8 Panel on Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The WTO and MEAs-Timc for a Good 
Neighbour Policy <http://wwics.si .edu/tef7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
8 
mechanism. 10 This dispute settlement regime is very sophisticated and leads to (a) 
adoption of a WTO panel report or a WTO Appellate Body Report within 12 months 
and (b) implementation of the p,mel's recommendations 18 months from the time 
the dispute was formally registered.
11 
Until the WTO, GA TT members could be a party to whichever trade 
agreements they chose. The WTO requires all members to participate in all 
agreements, except for plurilateral agreements on government procurement and civil 
aircraft. 12 The WTO agreements cover a wide range of international commerce 
including agriculture, textiles, clothing, banking, telecommunications, government 
purchases and intellectual property.
13 
During the closing stages of the Uruguay Round, environmental groups 
pressed for negotiations to address a number of environmental concerns. The 
ministers of the Uruguay round negotiations adopted the Marrakesh Ministerial 
decision on Trade and Environment. The decisions called for the establishment of a 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). This occurred at the first 
meeting of the WTO General Council, held January 31, 1995. 
The work of the CTE builds on the work of the previous GA TT Group on 
Environmental Measures and International Trade (EMIT). The EMIT group had not 
been established as a negotiating forum like the CTE its role was analytical rather 
than prescriptive. 
9 GATI formally adopted at the 1994 Marrakesh Conference establishing the WTO as "GAn' 
1994". 
10 T Alana Deere "Balancing Free Trade and the Environment: A Proposed Interpretation ofGATI' 
ArticleXX's Preamble"(l998) 10 lnt'I Legal Persp 1,1. 
11 Gary P Sampson Trade, Environment, and the WFO: The Post-Seattle Agenda (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) 45. 
12 Panel on Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The WTO and MEAs-Time for a Good 
Neighbour Policy <http://wwics.si.edu/tef7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
13 World Trade Organisation: Trading into the future 
<http://www. wto.orglenglich/thewto _ e/whatis_ e/ti f_ e.htm> (last accessed 18 September 200 I). 
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III MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
A What Are Multilateral Environmental Agreements? 
Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are international treaties or 
agreements that provide an important means of protecting the global environment.
14 
MEAs have been used to protect the ozone layer, preserve migratory animal species, 
and trade in hazardous substances. They are a preferred way to solve international 
environmental problems because they create a single coherent system of rules. This 
reduces the risk that countries will take measures that have effects on other countries 
without their consent. There are more than 200 MEAs currently in effect.
15 
It can 
only be expected that the number of MEAs will increase as globalisation continues, 
and the international community becomes more concerned with the environment.
16 
MEAs that are in force now are continuously evolving as environmental knowledge 
and problem-solving abilities steadily grow.
17 
B The General Legal Structure of Most MEAs 
International treaties can be cumbersome due to their treaty adoption and 
amendment procedures, so MEAs usually use a three-tiered approach.
18 
The first tier 
is a framework agreement, setting out the general obligations, which need to be 
implemented through national legislation. Domestic legislation must be in place 
prior to the ratification of a Convention. For example New Zealand intends to ratify 
the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure (Rotterdam 
Convention) in the very near future. This ratification cannot occur, without first 
amending legislation to put the export controls in place that are required under the 
14 Meeting international Environmental Obligations - Report of the Controller and Auditor-General 
<http://www.oag.govt.nz/HomePageFolders/ AuditOfficeReport/MIEO/MIEO.htm> (last accessed 22 
April 2002). 
15 Meeting international Environmental Obligations - Report of the Controller and Auditor-General 
<http://www.oag.govt.nz/HomePageFolders/AuditOfficeReport/MIEO/MI O.htm> (last accessed 22 
April 2002). 
16 Panel on Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The WTO and MEAs-Time for a Good 
Neighbour Policy <http://wwics.si.edu/tcf7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
17 For example, the Montreal Protocl has (a) expanded the list of covered items through the 
amendment process and (b) included stricter timetables for phase-outs by adjustments. Both 
amendments and adjustments result in new legally binding obligations. 
18 J Gehring "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectorial Legal Systems" ( 1990) I 
YTEL 47, 50. 
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Convention. These export controls prevent the prohibited substances from being 
exported out of the country. 
The second tier requires parties to agree upon a separate protocol 
implementing the framework agreement which contains more detailed obligations, 
for example the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer has the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). 
The third tier usually consists of annexes or appendices containing technical 
details, for instance a list of substances or species that are controlled by the protocol 
and the framework agreement. 
MEAs do not come under a single organisation such as the WTO. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) supports some of these 
agreements, some come under the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations and others are stand-alone agreements. 19 However, in resolution 53/242, the 
United Nations General Assembly did approve an annual, ministerial-level global 
environment forum under UNEP auspices. This forum is to review " important and 
emerging policy issues in the field of the environment, with due consideration for 
the needs to ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the governance 
mechanisms" ofUNEP.20 
In order to make important decisions the MEAs provide for a Conference of 
the Parties (COP) as the plenary body in which all contracting states are represented. 
The COP is the supreme body of the framework agreement, with the power to adopt 
all necessary internal and external decisions.21 The COPs of the MEAs usually meet 
once a year. Meeting of the Parties (MOP) has the same function but in regard to the 
protocols that have been concluded for the implementation of the framework 
19 Panel on Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The WTO and MEAs-Time for a Good 
Neighbour Policy <http://wwics.si.edu/tef7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
20 Panel on Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The WTO and ME/\s-Time for a Good 
Neighbour Policy <http://wwics.si.edu/tef7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
21 J Werksman "lne Conference of Parties to International Treaties (The Law & ustainable 
Development Series" in J Werksman(ed) Greening International Institutions ( Earth can Publications 
Ltd, 1996) 58-60. 
11 
agreement. In the MOP all states that have ratified the protocol are represented. The 
MOP adopts all internal and external decisions, in particular adjusting the 
annexes/appendices of the protocols.
22 
Dispute settlement provisions in the MEAs are still largely in early stages of 
development. 23 There are some that do not even contain any dispute-settlement 
provisions. MEAs typically focus on dispute avoidance rather than dispute 
settlement. They use ' sunshine' methods such as reporting, monitoring, on-site visits 
and transparency to induce compliance. MEAs also use positive incentives, such as 
financial or technical assistance, training programs and access to technology. 
An example of a MEA dispute settlement mechanism can be seen in the 
Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (Basel Convention). If a dispute occurred then it would be referred to 
negotiation or another peaceful means of the disputant' s choice. lf this 1s not 
successful, and if the parties agree, then the dispute is to be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to arbitration.
24 
Unlike the WTO, the Basel 
Convention provides no time lines and no set means of resolution if the parties do 
not agree as to how to proceed . 
C Trade Measures 
The GATT/WTO fosters free trade and facilitates economic growth, which 
in turn intensifies the pressure on the global environment.
25 Consequently, the major 
MEAs include trade-related measures to prevent environmental damage that can be 
linked to economic activities. Although trade measures might not always represent 
the best available option to address a g lobal environmental problem, they can 
provide one means to reach the objectives of MEAs.
26 
22 Werksman, above. 58-60. 
:!3 See for example conclusions reached in UNEP (2001 ), report item 6. 
24 See Basel Convention ( 1992), Article 20. 
25 Ryan L Winter " Reconciling the GATI and WTO with Multil ateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We I lave Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J .lnt' l Envtl.L.Pol'Y 223. 233. 
12 
The WTO has identified 33 MEAs that contain trade implications.
27 Four of 
these are not yet in force, fifteen are regional agreements, and one is no longer in 
force. 28 The most common type of trade measure used is the trade ban, either on 
exports or imports.29 Trade measures can also include product standards, notification 
procedures and labelling requirements.
30 The Kyoto Protocol (2000) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
31 is one of the most 
recent MEAs, which is suggested to have trade implications, but does not directly 
restrict trade as part of the agreement. 32 
There is debate over whether trade measures should be used at all, 
considering that they are not the root cause of environmental degradation. However, 
it is argued that there have not been any non-trade restricting alternatives that appear 
to be as effective.33 Trade restrictions also cause minimal disruption to the world 
economy.34 Overall it generally agreed that trade measures should only be used 
when necessary and where supported by an international agreement. The measures 
should be the least trade restrictive which are effective in achieving the 
environmental objective of the agreement. Any attempt to depend on trade measures 
as the only possible solution would lead to unjustifiable discrimination and 
protection ism. 
26 Submission by the European Communities Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) : 
Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda TNrrE/ W/ l (Geneva, CTE, 21 March 2002). 
27 WTO Secretariat Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant lo Selected MEAs WTJCTEIW I 160/ Rev.1 
(Geneva, CTE, 14 June 2001 ). 
28 WTO Secretariat Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant lo Selected MEAs WTICTEIW I 160/ Rev. I 
(Geneva, CTE, 14 June 200 I). 
29 Steve Chamovitz "A Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade and Environment" ( 1997) 14 
Ariz.J.Int ' l & Comp. Law 341,343. 
30Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Synthesis Report of Three ase Studies 
COM/ENV/TD (98) 127/FINAL. <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1998doc.nsf7LinkTo/com-env-
td(98) 127-final> (last accessed 21 April 2002). 
31 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change (10 December 
1997) reprinted in 37 1.L.M 22 ( 1998) (not yet in force). This Protocol is aimed at stabilising 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human-caused 
interference with the world 's climate system. 
32 Gary P Sampson Trade, Environment, and the WTO: The Post-Seal/le Agenda (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) 85. 
33 D Brack 'Toe Use of Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements" (RIIA 
Conference, London, 10 March 2000). 
34 D Brack "The Use of Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements" (RHA 
Conference, London, I O March 2000). 
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1 Environmental goals 
Trade restrictions have been used when it is the actual international trade of 
the substance or good that is causing the environmental problem. The Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)35 
agreement employs restrictions on the import and export of various threatened or 
endangered species listed in its appendices.36 These trade restrictions are explicitly 
provided for and mandatory under the MEA. They are used because it is the trade in 
these species and their products that is endangering them. 
37 
Another example is the Basel Convention,38 which restricts the import and 
export of hazardous materials. The environmental issue addressed by this 
Convention is protecting nations from harmful substances, in this case preventing 
damage to human health and the environment caused by the generation and disposal 
of hazardous wastes. 39 
2 Trade restrictions to encourage compliance and membership 
In order to encourage compliance, a number of treaties use trade measures to 
ensure that the members meet their international obligations under the MEA. This is 
achieved by applying more restrictive trade provisions against non-parties than to 
members within MEAs.40 The Montreal Protocol is an example of this type of trade 
measure. 
35 New Zealand ratified this Convention in 1989. 
36 See Convention on International Trade on Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.3, 
1973, 121.L.M. 1085, 1096 Appendices 1-11 (1973). It includes import restrictions under its 
certification scheme corresponding with its export restrictions. 
37 Michael B. Saunders "Comment, Valuation and International Regulation of Forest Ecosystems: 
Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement" ( 1991) 66 Wash. L. Rev 871 , 880-81. 
38 This Convention came into force on 5 May 1992, was signed by New Zealand at Basel on 22 
March 1989 and ratified by New Zealand on 20 Oecembcr J 994. 
39 Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Synthesis Report ofThree Case 
Studies COM/ENV/TD (98) 127/FINAL. <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1998doc.nst7LinkTo/com-
env-td(98) 127-final> (last accessed 21 April 2002). 
40 T Alana Deere "Balancing Free Trade and the Environment: A Proposed Interpretation of GAIT 
Article XX's Preamble" (1998) 10 lnt'I Legal Persp 1,3. 
14 
The Montreal Protocol is concerned with phasing out the production and 
consumption of fluorocarbons because these substances can be attributed to causing 
and increasing the hole in the ozone layer, which increases levels of UV radiation at 
ground level. This Protocol restricts trade in substances that deplete the ozone layer, 
as well as products that are produced in ozone-depleting manner. To protect the 
regime, which the Montreal Parties agreed to among themselves, the Protocol also 
applied trade restrictions on countries that did not ratify the Montreal Protocol.
41 
This had the effect of encouraging countries to join this MEA, especially developing 
countries that are one of the largest manufacturers of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
which is one of the restricted chemicals.42 There are also other MEAs, which have 
used trade sanctions as a means for compliance, for example the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling43 and the International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (JCCAT).
44 
IV ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION (WTO) 
_A Nature of the Conflict 
The concern about the relationship between the WTO and MEAs is that a 
number of MEAs contain trade measures, which are inconsistent with the core 
provisions of the WTO. For example the Basel Convention prohibits trade between 
parties and non-parties, which conflicts with GA TT Article XI that prohibits 
restrictions other than duties on products of any other contracting party. This 
conflict makes the MEAs very open to challenge from nations, especially those 
members of the WTO who are non-members of the MEA. 
41 The Montreal Protocol 
42 The importation of CFCs into New Zealand has been prohibited since I January 1996 and enforced 
under the Ozone Layer Protection Act 1996. 
43 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 
<http://sedac.cicsin.org/pidb/texts/intl.regulation.of.whaling.1946.html> (last accessed 23 May 2002). 
44 International Convention for Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
<http://environment.harvard.edu/guides/interpol/ indexes/treaties/lCCAT.html> (last accessed 23 May 
2002). 
15 
The WTO and MEAs represent two different bodies of international law and 
therefore the relationship between them should be fully understood. As it stands 
currently it is not known what would happen when measures taken in accordance 
with an MEA violate a government's obligations under the WTO or vice versa. It is 
also not clear as to which body of law would resolve the disputes.
45 
Many countries, including New Zealand avoid certain policy choices that are 
beneficial to the environment because they are unsure as to whether these measures 
would be inconsistent with GA TT rules. This uncertainty has also prevented further 
drafting or amendments being made to MEAs. There are no rules, which state how 
to avoid potential problems. An example is the Kyoto Protocol
46 
that contains a 
number of protracted and inconclusive negotiations. Clarification of this relationship 
would reduce or possibly eliminate the uncertainty between the WTO and MEAs 
and pave the way to avoiding any potential conflict while reinforcing the integrity of 
both systems. 
B Potential for Conflict 
There are many divergent views as to whether there is potential for conflict 
to occur between these two bodies of law. Countries including Mexico
47 
argue that 
no real problem exists. They advocate that because there are very few MEAs that 
contain trade measures and there have been no conflicts to date that have been 
brought to the WTO regarding an MEA, therefore it is unlikely that such a conflict 
would occur in the future.48 They also recognise that the WTO is becoming more 
sensitive to environmental issues in its handling of cases which could prevent 
problems in the future. 49 For example the UNEP have opened discussions with the 
45 Gary P Sampson Trade, Environment, and the WTO: The Post-Seatlle Agenda (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) 82. 
46 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( 10 December 
1997) reprinted in 37 LL.M 22 (1998) (not yet in force). 
47 See CTE/M/25 October 2000. 
48 Sampson, above, 83. 
49 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ( I O December 1998) 
Appellate Body WT/DS58/ AB/R. 
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WTO about the relationship between the WTO and MEAs. This view may also 
explain why the CTE has taken no action so far.
50 
However, there is no room for compJ£cy; the fact that there has not been 
any conflict in the past does not necessarily mean that there will not be any in the 
future. There are increasingly more MEAs, currently under negotiation, which have 
commercial and political importance, 51 for example the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Cartagena Protocol).52 It is important that there are suitable measures in 
place to avoid any conflict of the trade and environmental regimes, which provides 
greater certainty for further development of MEAs.
53 
1 The Reasons for Conflict 
The trade measures contained m some of the MEAs that are imposed for 
seemingly legitimate international environmental purposes might be used to protect 
the domestic industry at the expense of the foreign producers. This in itself may 
cause a challenge to be taken up within the WTO. It is usually individual Members 
with governments or powerful interest groups that use trade rules as a means of 
protecting themselves against environmental measures that are perceived as 
jeopardising their economic interests. 
54 
This protectionism can also happen unintentionally because environmental 
problems are often caused by the way a product is produced. MEAs sometimes 
include "production process method" (PPM) requirements.
55 These specify how 
something is to be made. Such standards may be necessary and legitimate in an 
MEA to achieve the agreement's objectives, since the environmental damage may 
come from the production process. These PPM requirements may conflict with the 
50 Sampson, above, 83. 
51 Sampson, above, 83 . 
52 Final Draft Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety submitted to legal drafting group. 
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1 /L.5 (28 January 2000). 
53 ampson, above, 83 
54 Sampson. above, 83 . 
55 J J Jackson The Jurisprudence of CATT & WTO (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000) 
430. 
17 
" like" requirement in national treatment. For example, the Montreal Protocol could 
apply to a semiconductor made with ozone depleting substances, which would be 
prohibited . However, the WTO would consider the finished products as " like" and 
would prohibit trade discrimination based on how the product was made. 
The risk that an MEA might have protectionist features is clearly far greater 
where there are fewer participants in the agreement.
56 If the MEA included the 
major trading nations, for example the United States, Europe and Asia and a number 
of other countries, then it would be less likely that the agreement would have 
protectionist features that were not critical to achieving the environmental objective. 
Additionally, to ensure that an MEA does not threaten growth prospects of the 
developing countries, any MEA should have a substantial number of developing 
countries.57 
Existing MEAs can become a potential for conflict in the future. The 
Montreal Protocol is an example of an MEA that has not provoked any complaints 
so far to the WTO but the prospect remains that if the ban on production and use of 
CFC's begins to bite economically, an appeal could be made which would , given all 
the precedents, succeed to the WTO panel and bring the Montreal Protocol in its 
entirety into question. There have been complaints in the past about the importation 
of second-hand refrigerators containing CFCs, which illustrate the kind of problems 
that could arise. 
An MEA could be amended to include a trade measure where previously 
there were no trade implications. MEAs with trade measures are increasing and 
existing MEAs are continually evolving (as is the WTO), so that the actions 
mandated by a specific agreement may change. A conflict is more likely to occur in 
56 Ministry for the Environment Trade and the Environment: The Risks and Opportunities for New 
Zealand Associated with the Relationship between the WTO and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Discussion Document (Wellington, 200 I). 
57 Sampson, above, 96. 
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the case where two countries are party to the WTO and the Convention, but only one 
of them is a party to the amendment.
58 
MEAs can be amended to create further possible divisions between 
countries, which in tum could create a situation for conflict. An example is the 
amendment to the Basel Convention which was a decision made at COP2 to ban 
movement of hazardous waste headed for final disposal and for recovery from 
Annex Vil countries to others. Annex VII countries are members of the OECD, EC, 
Liechtenstein. For the Ban Amendment to enter into force it needs to be ratified by 
three quarters of the Parties to the Convention that adopted Decision 111/1 at COP3 , 
i.e. , 62 Parties. There will be a split between countries that will be Party to the Basel 
Convention including the amendment and some, at least transitionally, will be Party 
to the Convention excluding the amendment. 
There is a great chance that disputes may arise from national measures 
undertaken to fulfil these obligations under the MEAs. The CITES for example, 
explicitly allows its Parties to take stricter national measures then the trade measures 
multilaterally agreed to. There is also the possibility that a party to an MEA in the 
name of the MEA, but without the formal sanction from the MEA could apply 
sanctions unilaterally.59 It is questionable whether WTO tribunals will permit 
unilateral measures that are not obligatory under MEAs, but are authorised or 
promoted by MEAs. 
The fact that MEAs have not been challenged so far can probably be 
attributed to the broad membership of countries across both the MEAs and the 
WT0.60 As mentioned earlier an inconsistency is more likely to arise where 
countries are both members of the WTO but only one is a member of the MEA. It 
58 Ministry for the Environment Trade and the Environment: The Risks and Opportunities for New 
Zealand Associated with the Relationship between the WTO and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Discussion Document (Wellington, 200 I). 
59 Panel on Multil ateral Environmental Agreements: ·n,e WTO and MEAs-Time for a Good 
Neighbour Poli cy <http://wwics.si.edu/tel7paper> (last accessed 20 May 2002). 
~ ew Zealand 's view (WTO, 2000 October 10, pg l ). 
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may also be due to countries not wishing to be seen as undermining an 
environmental agreement. 61 
[t has also been argued in the CTE that the WTO rules and the objectives of 
some MEAs are not mutually supportive. For example, that the Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs) of the WTO is inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which include the protection 
of the rights of indigenous people and transfer of environmentally sound technology. 
The fact that the Uruguay Round gave the WTO dispute settlement process 
more 'teeth ' 62 has meant that this dispute settlement process has been called on to 
settle more international environmental disputes than any other dispute settlement 
system.63 This could mean that in the future more such disputes will be undertaken, 
which makes it more likely that an MEA will be challenged in the future. There are 
a number of concerns about the dispute procedure itself, which may always relegate 
environmental issues behind those of trade. Proceedings within the WTO dispute 
settlement panels are closed preventing the public access to the proceedings.64 
Amicus briefs submitted by non-governmental organisations to the panel have 
generally not been accepted.65 Although this may change after the decision in the 
Shrimp-Turtle66 case, which suggested that amicus briefs may be acceptable in the 
future. 
C Unilateral Measures vs Multilateral Measures 
1 Article XX 
Article XX provides exceptions to the GA TT's core obligations for trade 
measures that address the need to consider the environment, in other words they are 
6 1 Gary P Sampson Trade, Environment, and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) 83 
62 This was because previously all parties to the dispute had to agree to make the decision binding. 
Now however all parties must disagree to the decision not to be enforced. 
63 Ryan L Winter "Reconciling the GA TI' and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We I lave Our Cake and Eat It TooT' (2000) 11 Colo.J.lnt ' l Envtl.L.Pol'Y, 223 234. 
64 ampson, above, 83. 
65 Sampson, above,83 . 
66 Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct 12, 1998, 33 I.L.M. 121 7.50-7.55 . 
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set of rules about when and how governments can use trade restrictions that would 
otherwise violate the rules of free trade. 
Article XX states: 
·'Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption." 
To fall within Article XX provisions the trade measure must meet both parts 
of the test. The tests are very high and in some cases very problematic.67 First, the 
trade measure must comply with the Article's "chapeau", that a restriction must not 
"constitute a means of arbitrary to unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail," and that it not be a "di sguised restriction on 
international trade."68 Recent panel rulings have given the "chapeau 's" requirements 
strict and broad applicability. The Shrimp-Turtles case may indicate a reversal of 
this trend . 69 
Once this test has been met then the measure must also fall within one of the 
two exceptions, either XX(b) or XX(g) . Article XX(b) specifies that the 
environmental measures must be shown to be "necessary". GA TT panels have 
67 Trade and the Environment : The Development of WTO Law Donald M McRae Otago Law Review 
( 1998) Vol 9 No 221 ,230-231. 
68 GATT art XX 
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interpreted "necessary" to mean that "there are no alternative measures that are 
consistent with the GA TT or no alternative measures that are less GA TT 
inconsistent than those adopted hat a government might reasonably be expected to 
employ and are not otherwise inconsistent with other GA TT provisions."70 Thus, in 
the Thai Cigarette case, 71 a panel found that restrictions on the importation of 
cigarettes was not justified under Article XX (b ), concluding that Thailand could 
have achieved its health objectives in respect of smoking by adopting measures that 
applied equally to foreign and domestic cigarettes rather than those that applied to 
fon;ign cigarettes alone. 
Article XX (g) permits states to take measures that would otherwise be 
inconsistent with their WTO obligations "relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restriction 
on domestic production or consumption." Defining what is an exhaustible resource 
has not been an easy task, however in the Reformulated Gasoline case,72 it accepted 
the view of the panel that "clean air"73 is an exhaustible natural resource.74 The 
interpretation of other aspects of the wording, for example "relating to" of Article 
XX (g) and of the chapeau to Article XX have proved to be more difficult and 
therefore provided a lot more debate. 75 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has only previously challenged 
unilateral or extraterritorial regulations rather than multilateral environmental trade 
measures.76 It was the Tuna-Dolphin I case77 that first raised doubts about whether 
69 Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct 12, 1998, 33 1.L.M. 121 7.50-7.55. 
70 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report of the Panel adopted 7 Novemenber 
1989. 36'h Supp.BLSD 345 (1990) para 5.26. 
71 Thailand-Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, report of the Panel 
adopted 7 November 1990, DS I 0/R, BISD 29'h Supp.200 ( 1991 ). 
72 United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate 
Bodyof29April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R. 
73 Note that clean air and living resources, including marine species, have been found to be 
"exhaustible natural resources" in WTO jurisprudence. It is likely that clean water would be 
considered to be such a resource. 
74 United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate 
Body of29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R 14. 
75 See Trade and the Environment: The Development of WTO Law Donald M McRae Otago Law 
Review ( 1998) Vol 9 No 221,230-235. 
76 See for example Tuna/Dolphin I & 11. 
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Article XX would cover multilateral agreements when it laid down a very restrictive 
interpretation of Article XX. 
This is a case where Mexico challenged an embargo on yellow-fin tuna 
imports imposed by the United States under its Marine Mammal Protection Act 
1972 because of Mexico 's failure to reach United States standards for dolphin 
protection. The panel found in favour of Mexico principally on the grounds that the 
United States had unilaterally imposed trade restrictions on imports of tuna based on 
how the tuna was produced outside United States jurisdiction.78 
The panel focused its attention on whether the dispute measure came within 
the scope of Article(b) or (g). It held that those paragraphs allow measures only to 
protect the environment within the jurisdiction of the government adopting the trade 
measure and do not cover a measure to prevent environmental harm or protect a 
resource occurring, entirely outside its jurisdiction. 79 
In 1994 there was another case referred to as the Tuna-Dolphin II,80 in which 
the panel found no basis in the GA TT for such a jurisdictional limitation on Article 
XX. Even so the panel concluded that the United States tuna embargo did not 
qualify under Article XX(g) because it did not protect the dolphin resource directly 
but operated by putting trade pressure on other governments to change their policies 
with respect to dolphin protection.81 
It is important to note that there is no reference to the word ''environment" in 
this Article. This is probably due to the fact when the GA TT was established 
environmental issues were not a serious concern. It has only been since the United 
77 Uni led Slates-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna [ 1991] BISD 39 S/ 155 para 5.25,5.26,5.31-5.32. The 
Tuna/Dolphin case was never officially adopted by GATT Council; Mexico negotiated with the 
United States on the Nonh American Free Trade Agreement, decided not to pursue GAIT remedies 
funher. 
78 Eric L Richards and Manin A Mc rory "The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the 
Environment, and International Trade Law" (2000) 71 U.Colo.L.Rev 295.163. 
79 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna [ 1991] BISD 39 SI 155 para 5.25,5.26,5.31-5.32. 
80 United Slates-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 33 I.L.M. 839 ( 1994) 
81 United States-Restrictions on lm)X)rts of Tuna 33 I.L.M. 839 ( 1994) paras 5.23-5.27. 
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that the 
international community has recognised that trade, environment and development 
policy were related. However, it was only after the appearance of the Brundtland 
Report in 198783 and in the midst of preparations for the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED or the Rio Earth Summit)8
4 
that the 
subject catapulted up the international agenda and the relationship between 
environmental concerns, development policies and global trade flows became a 
subject of wide international debate.85 
2 The differences between unilateral and multilateral measures 
There are a number of substantive differences between unilateral and 
multilateral measures that could support the argument that MEAs should be treated 
differently than unilateral trade measures.86 Unilateral measures are usually 
developed by one country without outside collaboration. 
87 This approach differs 
from MEAs, which are usually created through a collaborative and democratic 
process that involves multilateral debate, reducing the chance that the obligations 
would contain protectionist or offensive type restrictions.
88 
Unilateral measures usually only benefit that particular country, whereas 
MEAs are developed usually with a common goal that cross a wide range of 
countries, thereby the benefits or restrictions apply to all those who are members to 
the MEA. There is also a power difference between unilateral and multilateral 
measures taken by countries. The mere creation of unilateral measures by an 
individual country especially if stronger can be seen to influence weaker developing 
82The Text of the Stockholm Declaration 
<http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/STOCKHOLM-DECL.txt> (last accessed 23 
May 2002). 
83 The 1987 Bruntland Report <http://www.srds.ndirect.co.uk/sustaina.htm#The Bruntland Report > 
(last accessed 23 May 2002) . 
84 The 1987 Bruntland Report <http://www.srds.ndirect.eo.uk/sustaina.htm#The Bruntland Report > 
(last accessed 23 May 2002). 
85CTE on Trade Rules, Environmental Agreements and Disputes 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cteO l_e.htrn> (last accessed 23 May 2002). 
86 Ryan L Winter "Reconciling the GA TT and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J.lnt'I Envtl.L.Pol' Y, 223,234. 
87 Winter, above, 234. 
88 Michael l Jeffery 'Toe Environmental Implications ofNAFTA: A Canadian Perspective" ( 1994) 
26 Urb.L. 31,48. 
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nations. This contrasts with multilateral negotiation, which usually includes both 
developed and developing countries, which seemingly reduces the power difference, 
often associated with unilateral measures.89 
However, MEAs usually leave the development of domestic policy to the 
individual members, which can cause the members of MEA to enact legislation, 
which protects the domestic industry, which is very similar to enacting unilateral 
measures.90 This is very probable under the Kyoto Protocol, where Annex I 
governments who have different political and legal systems might pursue these 
policies in such a way as to unfairly favour domestic producers over foreign ones.91 
Therefore it may be the actual import ban and not the MEA inspiring it that would 
be the subject of any dispute in the WTO. If this is the case then the differences 
between unilateral measures and MEAs is redundant. The focus on the relationship 
should be looking towards the domestic legislation enacting these MEAs and 
preparing guidelines for those, rather than leaving these policy choices to individual 
countries. The danger here is the encroachment on countries sovereignty. 
(a) Shrimp-Turtle case 
The distinction between unilateral and multilateral measures has been 
recognised in the United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products case (Shrimp-Turtle case).92 This is a case where the United States 
instituted measures prohibiting imports of shrimps from other countries if they were 
caught in vessels not using Turtle Excluder Devices. The Panel and the Appellate 
Body ruled that the import ban violated GA IT Article XI and could not be justified 
under GA IT Article XX. In other words the United States was acting inconsistently 
with its WTO obligations in its attempt to protect endangered sea turtles. The 
decision held that the United States, the nation imposing a trade measure should 
have attempted bilateral or multilateral negotiations before enforcing its unilateral 
89 Winter, above. 234. 
90 Ministry for the Environment Trade and the Environment: The Risks and Opportunities for New 
Zealand associated with the relationship between the WTO and multilateral environmental 
agreements: Discussion Document (Wellington, 2001). 
91 Zhong Xiang Zhang and Lucas Assuncao "Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO" (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, December 200 I). 
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trade measure.93 This decision, however provided more then just the plight of the sea 
turtles it also indicates a shift in trade and environment jurisprudence under the 
GATT/WTO. Unfortunately, ther..! is still uncertainty as to whether this dictum will 
be applied if the occasion arises. 
D How Does International Law Deal With Conflicts Between Treaties? 
International law is problematic when considering the relationship between 
MEAs and the WTO. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
mandates that when two parties are bound to conflicting treaties, then the later treaty 
overrides the earlier treaty to the extent that they are inconsistent.94 This is the most 
used principle and known as /ex posterior.95 
Firstly, in regards to the GATT and WTO, which treaty would we use? lfwe 
used GATT, which was established in 194 7 when there was an inconsistency 
between the GA TT and the MEA then the MEAs would override the GA TT, as they 
came into force after 1947. If the WTO is used, which is more likely then the 1994 
WTO would override most MEAs (those that became binding before 1994), and 
future MEAs would overrule both the GA TT and the WT0.96 Determining the 
treaty's date also presents a problem as they can be amended and there is uncertainty 
about whether the original date should be used or the amended date. What also has 
to be considered with this rule, /ex posterior is that it only applies to parties who are 
members of both agreements and therefore excludes the situation where a WTO 
member is not a member of the MEA takes up the challenge or vice versa. 
92 Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct 12, 1998, 33 T.L.M. 121 7.50-7.55 . 
93 Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct 12, 1998, 33 I.L.M . 121 7.50-7.55. 
94 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. May 23, 1969, art 30(3), P 3, 1155 U.N.T.S.331, 
339. 
95 Robert E Hudec "GA TT Legal Restraints on the Use of Measures against Foreign Environmental 
Practices" in Jagdish Bhagwatu and Robert E Hudec (eds) Fair Trade and 1/armoni=ation: 
Prerequisites for Free Trade? Volume 2: Legal Analysis (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass and London), 
1996 121. 
96 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art 30(3), P 3, 1155 U.N.T.S.331, 
339. 
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The wording of the Vienna Convention also requires that the successive 
treaties must relate to the same subject matter.
97 To satisfy this requirement, one 
wou Id have to conclude that the MEA and the GA TT dealt with the same subject 
matter. While it may be argued that both agreements invoke trade sanctions, it 
would be very difficult to suggest that they relate to the same subject matter. The 
GA TT and now the WTO subject matter relate to the liberalisation of trade. MEAs 
on the other hand, have, as their subject matter environmental objectives and the use 
of trade measures could be argued as incidental.98
 It would be difficult to argue that 
the Basel Convention has as its subject matter the liberalisation oftrade.
99 
lf it was concluded that both these treaties were of the same subject matter 
then, consideration needs to be given to the rule of " /ex specialis " or the idea of 
specificity. This rule maintains that specific treaties should override general treaties 
when they relate to the same subject matter, no matter when the two were 
negotiated. 100 Even though the WTO is later in time relative to a MEA, the MEA 
should override the WTO because it is more specific.
10 1 
According to a widely held view in the CTE, trade measures that parties to a 
MEA treaty have agreed , could be regarded as /ex specialis, prevailing over WTO 
provisions. This would mean that provisions would not give rise to legal problems in 
the WTO even if the agreed measures were inconsistent with WTO rules. However, 
this is not a definitive interpretation, and numerous uncertainties remain. Another 
point that could be raised is that where Parties to one international agreement 
subsequently adopt a second international agreement that is inconsistent with the 
first, the Parties waived rights afforded to them under the first. 
102 
97 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art 30(3), P 3, 1155 U.N.T.S.331 , 
339. 
98 Ryan L Winter .. Reconciling the GAIT and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat lt Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J.lnt'I Envtl.L.Pol ' Y, 223 234. 
99 Winter, above,234. 
100 Annick Emrnenegger Brunner "Conflicts between International Trade and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements" ( 1997) Ann. Surv. lnt' I & Comp. L. 74, 77-88. 
101 Brunner, above, 77-88. 
102 See United States-Restrictions on Imports ofTuna, Sept 3, I 991(unadopted), GAIT B.l.S.D. (39
1
h 
Supp) at 155 (1991). 
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Overall international law is unclear as to which agreement or treaty would 
overrule if there were a dispute in the MEA/WTO, which further justifies the need to 
establish clarification within this relationship. The Vienna Convention is also 
difficult to reconcile with the expectations of those who are party to both treaties. If 
enforced to resolve trade and environmental conflicts the Convention rule will 
invalidate outstanding international environmental law that required over thirty 
years of intensive negotiations to develop. This is not likely to have been the 
intention when nations reaffirmed the GA TI at the Uruguay Round. 
V RESOLVING THE WTOIMEA DEBATE 
A The Mandate Under the Doha Declaration 
This issue of how to handle disputes involving MEAs and the WTO has long 
been on the agenda of the CTE. However, it was at the fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 200 I, that WTO members finally agreed 
to start negotiations on " the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific 
trade obligations set out in MEAs." 103 These negotiations form constitute an 
important element on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
104 
1 Mandate Under Paragraph 31 (i) 
For the purposes of the new Doha Round, trade and the environment is 
contained in the paragraphs 31,32 and 51. Paragraph 3 I (i) provides a specific 
mandate for negotiations on some aspects of the relationship between MEAs and 
WTO rules. 31 (ii) provides for "negotiations" on information sharing between 
MEAs and WTO committees, and 31 (iii) provides for negotiations on barriers to 
environmental goods and services. 
Paragraph 32 calls for the CTE, in pursuing work on "all items on the agenda 
within its current terms of reference", to give particular attention to linkages with 
market access, with labelling and with relevant TRIPS provisions; and calls for the 
103 See paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Mandate. 
104 WTO Website <http://www.wto.org!english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm> (last accessed 24 May 
2002). 
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Committee to identify any need to clarify relevant WTO rules and include in its 
report to the 5th Ministerial Conference recommendations on future action, 
"including the desirability of negotiations". 
Paragraph 51 provides for the CTE and the CTD to act as forums to identify 
and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations in order to 
help achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately 
reflected. 
This mandate, particularly Paragraph 31 (i) has provided considerable debate 
as to what can be addressed in these particular negotiations and in particular to what 
extent it addresses the MEA/WTO relationship. For example, what is a specific trade 
obligation? What is a MEA for these purposes? 
31. With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and 
environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on: 
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set 
out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) . The negotiations shall be 
limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to 
the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any 
Member that is not a party to the MEA in question; 
(ii) proceduresjor regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the 
relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status; 
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services. 
(a) What are "existing WTO rules" and ' specific trade obligations?" 
Part of the discussion within the CTE is in relation to what is the meant by 
the terms "existing WTO rules" and "specific trade obligation". Argentina has 
29 
provided a recent submission, 
105 which provides guidelines as to how these terms 
should be interpreted in the negotiations. They have defined "existing WTO rules" 
to be encompassing all the provisions of agreements, which are currently in force
106 
and "specific trade obligations" to cover the provisions of MEAs, which entail an 
"obligation". The term "trade obligations" does not appear to extend to measures not 
required by an MEA. Therefore all non-mandatory trade measures, non-trade 
obligations and non-specific trade obligations in an MEA are excluded. It is 
important to note that Argentina's definitions are considered to be very narrow and 
have not been unanimously agreed amongst the WTO members. 
The European Community has also submitted guidelines as to what this 
mandate includes or excludes for the negotiations.
107 They have taken a very 
different approach and sorted the various types of trade measures, ranging from 
mandatory to non-mandatory into categories that need to be analysed in detail in 
order to determine where any cut-off point or points between "specific" and "non-
specific" trade obligations exist.
108 They have not specifically chosen which should 
or should not be included as in the Argentinean submission.
109 
What is interesting is that all previous discussions on the relationship 
between WTO rules and MEA provisions has focused on the term ''trade measures" 
for environmental purposes. However, as highlighted in Argentina's submission, 
11 0 
the term "trade measures" is different from the phrase "specific trade obligations" in 
the Doha Declaration. This has been one of the main reasons why so much debate 
has occurred because no one is sure whether they are meant to mean the same thing 
or not. lf Argentina's guidelines were accepted then it would appear that from a list 
105Submission by the Argentine Republic Mandate Under Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration 
On Trade and Environment TNfl'E/W/2 (Geneva, CTE, 23 May 2002). 
106 These are known as "covered agreements". 
107 Submission by the European Communities Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs): 
Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda TNffE/W/ 1 (Geneva, CTE, 21 March 2002). 
108 Submission by the European Communities Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) : 
Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda TNffE/W/ 1 (Geneva. CTE, 21 March 2002). 
109 Submission by the Argentine Republic Mandate Under Paragraph 3/(i) of the Doha Declaration 
On Trade and Environment TNfl'E/ W/2 (Geneva, CTE, 23 May 2002). 
110 ubmission by the Argentine Republic Mandate Under Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration 
On Trade and Environment TNffE/W/2 (Geneva, CTE, 23 May 2002). 
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of the most relevant MEAs 111 that only CITES, Montreal Protocol, and the Basel, 
Rotterdam, Stockholm on Persistent Organic Pollutants112 Conventions are captured, 
as others appear to lack "specific trade obligations" even if they contain less specific 
measures of some sort. 
(b) What is a multilateral environmental agreement for these purposes? 
What is considered, as a "multilateral environmental agreement" has also 
been a subject for debate, as the term MEA is very wide and could include regional 
agreements or even an OECD Council Act. Argentina's submission 
113 
purports that 
MEAs to be negotiated should cover only agreements which are currently in force, 
have been negotiated and signed under the guidance of the United Nations, its 
specialised agencies or the UNEP, have attained a certain degree of universality and 
are open. 114 Therefore their interpretation does not provide a very extensive list of 
MEAs that can be included in these negotiations. If only in force then this would 
exclude, the Kyoto, Biosafety, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions to name a 
few, and these potentially are questionable in the WTO/MEA relationship, mainly 
because they are not as yet tested. 
2 The Australian proposal 
The Australians proposed a three-phase process for MEA negotiations in 
June 2002 115 that has attracted broad support as a way forward. In the first phase 
they suggested that the CTE should identify (a) the specific trade obligations in 
MEAs that are to be discussed and (b) the WTO rules that are relevant to these 
bi . . i 16 Th d . h . ' . 111 b o 1gat1ons. e paper propose using t e secretariat s matnx as a ase 
document for the first part of this exercise. A second phase would use information 
111 See WTO/CTE/W / 160/Rev. I of 14 June 200 I, an updated matrix produced for the 27 June CTE. 
112 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants http://www.chem.unep.ch/sdhtm (last 
accessed 25 August 2002). 
11 3 Submission by the Argentine Republic Mandate Under Paragraph 3l{i) of the Doha Declaration 
On Trade and Environment TNffE/W/2 (Geneva, CTE, 23 May 2002). 
114 Submission by the Argentine Republic Mandate Under Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration 
On Trade and Environment TNffE!W/2 (Geneva, CTE, 23 May 2002). 
11 5 Submission by Australia Suggested Procedure For the Negotiations Under Paragraph 31 (i) of the 
Doha Declaration TNffE/ W/7 (Geneva, CTE, 7 June 2002). 
11 6 Submission by Australia Suggested Procedure For the Negotiations Under Paragraph 31 (i) of the 
Doha Declaration TNffE/W/7 (Geneva, CTE, 7 June 2002). 
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sessions with relevant MEA secretariats plus members' own experiences to 
determine whether there have been particular implementation issues with the 
"specific trade obligations" identified in the first phase. The third phase would 
involve discussion of "matters arising" from the work undertaken in phases one and 
two, and would focus on the outcome of the negotiations. 
The Australian proposal has the advantages of (a) also calling for the 
relevant WTO rules to be identified in the course of the first phase of work (b) 
identifying a specific role in the process for MEA secretariats. The Australian 
presumption, and others is that an examination in this sort of format will 
demonstrate the lack of problems requiring solutions. The mandates exclusion of 
non-party issues makes this all the more likely. This process has a sound common 
sense attitude towards it especially as a way to get over the pedantic intricacies 
within the definitions, however it is important to look not only at the WTO rules, but 
also the relevant WTO jurisprudence. This will reveal how certain conflicts may be 
dealt with in the future. 
B The Scope oftlie Mandate 
What is plain enough is that the negotiation will in any case be narrow in its 
scope and as stated in paragraph 31 (i) the mandate is further constrained by the 
sentence "The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of such 
existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question." Thus, while the 
mandate gives scope for clarification of some aspects of the complex relationship, 
namely the relationship with any "specific trade obligations" in an MEA between 
WTO and MEA rules, it excludes the most important and most difficult issue, 
namely the handling in the WTO of a situation in which a non-party of a MEA 
challenges a trade-related measure taken pursuant to that MEA by one of its 
members. The limitation in the mandate is unfortunate as this is the more likely 
scenario for a conflict and it is desirable that all aspects of the WTO/MEA 
relationship are discussed. Although these wider MEA/WTO issues may be able to 
11 7 See WTO/CTE/W/ 160/Rev. I of 14 June 2001 , an updated matrix produced for the 27 June CTE. 
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be discussed in the CTE under the less restrictive paragraph 32 of the mandate, 
however, this is uncertain at this stage. 
This restrictive mandate could push some countries to use the CTE's existing 
terms of reference and existing work programme, which gives it a quasi-negotiating 
mandate. The 1994 terms of reference provide the CTE to make recommendations 
on "whether any modifications of the provisions of the multilateral trading system 
are required". 118 Therefore some members of the WTO may be able to persuade 
other members to contemplate such recommendations. This is not agreeable to many 
countries who do not consider that any changes need to be made to the multilateral 
rules themselves. Therefore this may create more upset and prolong the discussions 
even further before actually making any firm decisions in regard to the WTO/MEA 
relationship. 
The end result is a mandate that is narrowly drafted and lacks clarity in 
critical areas, which is probably due to members of the WTO remaining sharply 
divided on the area of trade and environment and perhaps the facilitating of the 
process and circumstances in which the declaration was drafted. It is likely to lead to 
a stand off on the question of concluding an agreed understanding on Article XX of 
GAIT. 
C Negotiations Purely within the WTO 
Paragraphs 31 (i) and (ii) appear to envisage negotiations purely within the 
WTO, as with other negotiations under the single undertaking. This means that if it 
is decided that there are problems attributable to a gap or flaw in the WTO rules, 
(which many countries including New Zealand do not think so) then a solution is 
restricted to changing or amending the GA TT/WTO rules. This view excludes 
considering the MEA trade provisions or otherwise as possible sources of difficulty 
at the intersection of the two. It may also allow dispute settlement panels to establish 
policy, which some WTO members and observers have, real concerns about. The 
118 The Trade and Environment Committee, and Doha preparations 
<http//www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minOl _e/briefl l_e.htm> (last accessed 18 
August 2002). 
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EC have proposed two different approaches to resolve the conflict. These are a 
textual change to Article XX and reversing the burden of proof. 
1 Textual change to Article XX" 
The European Union purports that there are gaps in the WTO rules and therefore 
one of their proposals is to seek a textual change to GA TT Article XX. The 
amendment process seeks to create a provision that clearly demonstrates the Parties 
intent to except MEA trade measures from GATT obligations. It has been suggested 
by others 11 9 that Article :XX(b) should be amended to read " reasonably necessary to 
protect the natural environment and human health." This would modernise this 
Article to reflect concern for the environment, which was not evident when GA TT 
was first established. 120 This amendment would also remove the overly strict "least 
trade restrictive" criterion for such measures. In addition, Article XX could be 
amended to provide a "safe harbour" for MEAs that employ trade measures that are 
reasonably necessary and reasonably related to the subject matter of the 
agreement. 121 
However, if such a provision or other provisions are drafted then there must 
be some care as to what language is used, so that is can account for existing treaties 
and prevent prejudicing future MEAs. Tn this case there is still the difficulty of 
interpretation and the precedent that is set once it is amended- does this mean every 
time a new MEA comes along that doesn't quite fit into the amendment that more 
amendments are made? It could get very complicated. It should also be remembered 
that MEAs are appealing because of their flexibility and therefore codification of the 
relationship through an interpretation of Art XX does risk stifling dynamism and 
innovation in international environmental law. 
122 
119 Thomas J Schoenbawn" International Trade and Protection of the Environment: 'fhe Continuing 
Search for Reconciliation'' (1997) 91 A.J .I.L 268. 277. 
120 Schoenbawn , above. 277. 
121 Schoenbaum, above, 277. 
122 Ryan L Winter "Reconciling the GAIT and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J .Int'I Envtl.L.Pol ' Y 223, 233. 
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2 Reversal of burden of proof 
The European Union has also purported the proposal ofreversing the burden 
of proof. 123 Under current WTO rules if a WTO member challenged another in 
regard to the MEA mandate they had adopted then the MEA member would be 
required to prove that the MEA measure meets the requirements of Article XX. The 
proposition purported by the European Union would reverse this burden of proof in 
a case involving an MEA to require that the complainant prove the measure is 
inconsistent with Article XX. This proposition has been also been met with strong 
opposition, especially from developing countries and would not necessarily resolve 
the problem where MEAs are being superseded by the WTO. rt also would not 
resolve the situation whereby the trade measures were being used for protectionist 
purposes which is one of the main issues with trade measures being used in 
MEAs. 124 
It is argued by the European Community125 that the fact that any trade 
measures in an MEA are negotiated and agreed by consensus in a multilateral 
context and that this should be, in principle, a guarantee against discriminatory and 
protectionist action. Therefore challenges between Parties over specific trade 
measures are highly unlikely from both a political and legal point of view. 
Accordingly, if Parties have agreed specific trade obligations, they should have no 
reason or ground to challenge them afterwards. The European Community is also of 
the view that were such a case to arise then the Parties involved should make every 
effort to solve the issue through the MEA dispute settlement, as recommended by 
the CTE in its report to Singapore.
126 
123 Winter, above, 233. 
124 Winter, above, 233. 
125 Submission by the European Communiti es M11/1i!aleral Environmental Agreemenls (MEAs): 
fmp/emen/a/ion of /he Doha Deve/opmenl Agenda TN{fE/W/ 1 (Geneva, CTE, 2 1 March 2002) . 
126 Submission by the European Communities Mullilaleral Environmenlal Agreements (MEA s): 
fmplemen/ation of 1he Doha Deve/opmenl Agenda TNrrE/W/1 (Geneva, rE, 2 1 March 2002). 
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D Information Sharing 
Working towards a solution may greatly benefit from information sharing 
among specialists in different capitals. With 31 (ii) likewise it is difficult to see the 
logic of a unilateral approach to the development of "procedures for information 
exchange" as they would agree to negotiate or discuss this with MEAs secretariats 
sooner or later. The UNFCCC secretariat has sought the help from the WTO for 
proposed compliance and dispute settlement system under the Kyoto Protocol. 
127 
However, as discussed earlier it is more likely that a conflict would occur due to the 
national legislation rather than because of the trade measures, which is not usually 
developed in conjunction with WTO officials. 
There is also scope for WTO tribunals to include environmental experts in 
WTO tribunals as the DSU mandate states that the panellists are "well-qualified'' 
individuals, and that members should be selected with the objective of creating "a 
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience."
128 
Similarly, 
the WTO Director-General could specially appoint a judge who is aware of both 
trade and environmental protection concerns. 129 As mentioned earlier the Shrimp-
Turtles Appellate Body Report, has mentioned that individuals and organisations 
could submit amicus briefs to WTO tribunals. 
130 Tribunals also have the authority 
to create an advisory panel for scientific and technical matters.
131 Th is cou Id prove 
very useful in disputes involving environmental trade measures, which often require 
complicated factual findings. 132 
E Other Approaches to Resolving the Dispute 
In amongst the vast array of opinions, and ideas as how to structure or 
resolve the relationship between MEAs and the WTO there have been some strong 
127 This was con finned at a CTE special session hearing. 
128 See WTO Agreement Annex 2 "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Di sputes", reprinted in 33 l. L. M. 11 25. at 1226-47 ( 1994) art 8. 
129 Steve Chamovitz "Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settl ement'· ( 1998) 32 lnt' l Law 
901,918. 
130 Sec DSU art 13.2 
131 See DSU art 13. 
132 Chamovitz, above, 918. 
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proposals that have stood out and dominated the others. In recalling these, it is 
important to understand that the approach a country will purport does tend to depend 
on whether they are a developed or developing country. Developing countries are 
naturally suspicious of developed countries, and the changes they may wish to make 
especially as previously the developing countries have used the WTO forum to bring 
to task some of the developed countries unilateral environmental measures, for 
example the Tuna-Dolphin case. 
Some of the proposals that suggest amending or changing the WTO rules 
have been blocked by developing countries (most actively by India, Egypt and 
Brazil) as they see any change in the WTO rules on the topic as abandoning or 
weakening their rights to challenge such measures as WTO inconsistent.
133 There 
have been a number of other approaches that have been supported by more 
developing countries, as they do not require change as such as more prescriptive 
criteria approaches. 
1 Savings clause 
Some countries advocate the inclusion of a "savings clause" to clarify that 
the Protocol is not intended to affect the rights and obligations of parties under other 
international agreements. Under such a provision, the Protocol must be compatible 
with existing international agreements, including but not limited to WTO 
Agreements. In the presence of a savings clause provision, disputes under the 
Protocol could probably be challenged at the WTO. For example, under a savings 
clause, a country could challenge the application of an AIA to exports under the SPS 
or TBT Agreements of the WTO. A number of countries oppose savings clause 
provision and would have the Protocol trump existing agreements such as the WTO 
Agreements. 
133 Richard H Steinberg "Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA and WTO: Regional 
Trajectories of Rule Development" ( 1997) 91 /\.J. I. L 23 1,243. 
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2 Principals and criteria approach 
Canada and Switzerland have both created a set of criteria to assist WTO 
panels in assessing MEA trade measures and international negotiators contemplating 
the use of trade measures in an M EA. The aim is to recognise and support 
multilateral solutions to global environmental problems and to accommodate them 
within the trade regime. 
The criteria they have both used is very similar and they suggest the 
considerations should be that (i) trade measures be chosen when effective and when 
other alternative measures were considered to be ineffective in achieving the 
environmental objective or when other measures proved to be ineffective without 
accompanying trade measures (ii) that trade measures should not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to achieve the environmental objective concerned ; and (iii) 
that the trade measures chosen should not constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination . 
There is a concern that the criterion does not guarantee a consideration by all 
WTO panels that then may not give this meaningful effect. 134 This approach also 
does not take into account the fact that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is 
based solely on WTO agreements and it is not feasible for the panel to consider 
principles that go beyond these. 135 There is also the fear that this criteria approach 
could easily become a hierarchy. 
3 Voluntary consultative mechanism 
New Zealand prefers to take a more voluntary approach and has suggested 
that co-operation and co-ordination should also take place between member 
countries within the MEA context. 136 This position has received agreement from 
other countries, including Canada. This co-operation and co-ordination at the 
domestic level is equally if not more important for policy coherence. This proposal 
134Ryan L Winter " Reconciling the GATI' and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J.Int'l Envtl.L.Pol'Y 223. 250. 
135 This was a view presented by I long Kong at a CTE session in June 1999 CTE/M/21. 
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would encourage a country implementing obligations under an MEA to consult with 
a Member country before implementing a trade measure. 
There is however a question as to whether a country which is a Party to an 
MEA would have the flexibility to implement its obligations under the MEA in this 
manner, particularly in situations where trade measures in an MEA are precisely 
drafted. ln such cases, a party may not be in the position to negotiate with a non-
Party on the implementation of an MEA measure and still be able to meet its 
obligations under the MEA. Therefore the proposed voluntary consultative 
mechanism could unduly complicate the implementation of MEAs. 
4 Change of forum 
If there is a real problem m the WTO/MEA relationship then perhaps 
consideration should be given to a more multilateral process that is not confined to 
the WTO. It has only been recently that environmental interests have been 
recognised in the WTO as in the Shrimp-Turtle case, but there have been no rulings 
that have embraced environmental issues. If disputes were adjudicated in a different 
forum, adjudication might become more objective as the GATT/WTO would be 
forced to compete on a more level playing field.
137 
In the event a dispute arises between WTO members who are also signatories 
to an MEA, then it could be referred to the dispute settlement mechanisms available 
under that MEA or directly to the ICJ. 138 The CTE Report suggested that MEA 
settlement bodies become more involved in trade and environment disputes.
139 
There is a problem with this suggestion because MEAs are regarded as weak bodies 
of law. In many instances, they do not have a dispute settlement body, or include a 
provision referring the dispute to arbitration or the ICJ .
140 Although there is the 
possibility of strengthening the MEA dispute settlement procedure so that it would 
13
" This was a view presented by New Zealand at a Cl'E session in June 2001 C J'E/M/27. 
137 Winter, above.233. 
138Steve Chamovitz "Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement" ( 1998) 32 lnt ' I Law 
901 , 918. 
139 See Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Nov 14, 1996, PRESS/TE 014 
(19%) 178. 
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be less likely that there would be a need to resort to dispute settlement mechanisms 
in the WTO. 
Currently, if a dispute were to arise with a non-party to an MEA, and another 
WTO member, then the WTO would provide the only possible forum for resolving 
the dispute. 141 In order for the dispute to be referred to the WTO then members 
would need to waive their rights. This is because if a WTO member brought the 
dispute then in the current form it must be brought before the WTO. This could be 
resolved under Article IX:3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which allows 
the waiver of any obligations in "exceptional circumstances" by vote of a three-
fourths majority of the member states. 142 This means that WTO members cou Id 
waive their rights to hear the dispute in the WTO. This view has been supported by a 
number of environmental groups including the World Wildlife Fund.
143 
However, as some MEAs are vague and only have a few members it is 
doubtful that any WTO member would be comfortable deferring their trade rights to 
these MEAs. The test itself is also very vague, "exceptional circumstances" and if 
the rights were waived then it would only apply to some MEAs and not others. The 
waiver would also require periodic renewal, and thus only offers temporary 
reprieve. 144 This approach appears to rank the GA TT/WTO and trade liberalisation 
above MEAs and environmental protection. 145 Finally, it should be remembered that 
the WTO dispute process is only open to trade related disputes. If the dispute were 
related to the lack of progress in the implementation of environmental measures it 
would have to go through to the MEA. 
140 For example, The Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal , Mar 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M 657 ( 1989) Art 20. 
141 The Trade and Environment Committee, and Doha Preparations 
<http//www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto _ e/minist_ e/minO l _ e/briefl 1 _ e.htm> (last accessed 18 
August 2002). 
142 See Article X(l). Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, May 23, 1969, arts 11-16, 34,39. 
143 (WWF, 2001, October page 2) 
144 Annick Emmenegger Brunner "Connicts Between lnternational Trade and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements" ( 1997) 4 Ann. Surv.lnt'I & Comp.L 74, 94. 
145 Ryan L Winter "Reconciling the GA 1T and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J.lnt'I Envtl.L.Pol'Y 223, 248. 
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5 A global environmental organisation 
A Global Environmental Organisation (GEO) would provide a system that 
could be as powerful as the GA TT/WTO dispute settlement system. 146 It departs 
from the view that environmental issues should be integrated into the WTO as this 
puts too much stress on the WTO. The WTO specialises in trade issues, which 
makes it very difficult for it to take on environmental aspects in a satisfactory way. 
There will always be suspicion when an environmental decision is made, especially 
if it favours trade as opposed to the environment. 
A GEO would provide a balance between trade and environment, which 
would give environment first-equal place with trade issues. 147 Such an organisation 
has advantages over the current regime of MEAs, which consists of a number of 
treaties that deal with environmental problems on a case-by case-basis.
148 
The 
difficulty is creating such a system is one that is acceptable to countries as like the 
WTO it would impinge on their sovereignty. There are also issues related to cost, 
the formation of the structure, which makes its formation in the near future very 
unlikely. However the GEO does not need to be a new bureaucracy. It could be a 
consolidation of a number of existing UN agencies with environmental 
responsibilities into a streamlined new body with a decentralised structure that 
draws significantly on outside expertise non-governmental organisations, academics 
and business community. 149 At the moment there are many treaties/ agreements all 
with their own rules, COPs and MOPs. It may be more useful if these were all 
brought together under unified leadership, which would also permit the rationalising 
of priorities and budgets. 150 
146 Ryan L Winter " Reconciling the GAIT and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?" (2000) 11 Colo.J.lnt'I Envtl.L.Pol'Y 223, 251. 
147 Annick Emmenegger Brunner "Conflicts Between International Trade and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements" 4 Ann. Surv. lnt'I & Comp. L. 74. I 00. 
148 Daniel Esty Greening the CATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, 1994) 219-220. 
149 Professor Daniel C Esty "Global Environment Agency Wi 11 Take Pressure off WTO" ( 13 July 
2000) Financial Times Washington <http//:globalpolicy.orglsocecon/environmt/esty.htm> (last 
accessed 25 August 2002). 
150 Professor Daniel C Esty" Global Environment Agency Will Take Pressure olTWTO" ( 13 July 
2000) Financial Times Washington <http//:globalpolicy.orglsocecon/environmt/esty.htm> (last 
accessed 25 August 2002). 
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6 An authoritative text 
Although the preferred approach would be to take the debate out of the WTO 
and use a more global forum , the fact remains that it would most likely be a WTO 
member bringing the dispute to the WTO and there it still necessary to have 
clarification when actually developing the MEAs that include trade measures. It is 
also unlikely that such a scheme for a global forum will be in place in the very near 
future and there is a real need for clarification and certainty now. 
One idea would be to opt for an authoritative text in the form of an 
Understanding or a Declaration or a Decision on the Relationship between existing 
WTO rules and Specific Trade Obligations in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements that records appropriate interpretations. The text should be given legal 
status through adoption by the Ministerial Conference and form part of the results of 
the ODA negotiations, using the understandings or declarations of the Uruguay 
Round as a model. 
The text could tentatively include a chapeau which would contain a 
reaffirmation of the commitment to sustainable development, the need to enhance 
the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment policies in general and of the 
need to clarify the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade 
obligations set out in MEAs specifically. 
This approach should include an operative part which would record in the 
agreement that international environmental problems are best dealt with in a 
multilaterally manner, that multilateral environmentally policy should to the extent 
possible be drawn up within MEAs. It should also include a statement that if there is 
a conflict between parties to a MEA in relation to the implementation of that 
agreement then it should be solved within the framework of the MEA and not be the 
subject of dispute settlement in the WTO. 
42 
This approach should also include an endorsement of findings made by 
relevant panels under the WTO dispute settlement system. The findings that should 
be included here are those that have the most general applicability. The most 
prominent example would be the Shrimp-Turtle case, 151 which legitimises the use of 
restrictive trade measures for the purpose of protecting the environment and the 
sustainable use of natural resources, provided that the measures are not 
discriminatory or arbitrary in nature. The panel also underlines the need to solve 
environmental problems in a multilateral context. These, and other relevant findings 
should serve as guidance for the efforts that are needed to achieve an outcome in 
which trade and environment policies are truly mutually supportive, and thereby 
consistent with the need of sustainable development. 
This approach could provide a useful reference for WTO panels in 
understanding trade measures for environmental purposes, and if adopted by UNEP 
and MEAs, it would also give MEA negotiators a sense of how to develop clear and 
predictable trade measures. The application of the Principles and Criteria approach 
in the negotiations of the Stockholm Convention has re-affirmed their usefulness in 
helping to guide negotiators in drafting trade measures, which will not conflict with 
WTO obligations. 
This approach is only one idea to at least act as a guide in clarifying the 
relationship between the WTO and MEAs. It takes on various aspects of some of the 
other approaches, for example deferring any conflict to the MEA itself. It would 
then need to be sure that all MEAs have some kind of dispute settlement 
mechanism. However, the most ideal approach would be to have an outside global 
forum, which would give environment the status it needs and the assurance that it 
will not be relegated to second place behind trade matters in the future. 
VI CONCLUSION 
A global response to increased economic activity, which has impacted on our 
environment, has been the introduction and use of MEAs. These agreements are the 
151 Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct 12, 1998, 33 l.L.M. 121 7.50-7.55. 
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best way to co-ordinate policy action that tackles global and transboundary 
environmental problems co-operatively. There is real potential for conflict due to 
some of the MEAs containing trade measures, which are inconsistent with the core 
provisions of the WTO. If such a conflict occurred it would damage the WTO and 
the efforts of the international community to protect the environment. 
The relationship between the WTO and MEAs needs to be clarified in order 
to protect the future drafting of MEAs and to allow countries to put in place 
legislation to enforce the treaties they have put in place. laritication would 
reinforce the integrity of both systems. 
It was significant when the Doha mandate included environment on its 
agenda for negotiations but short lived as the mandate is not satisfactory in resolving 
all aspects of the WTO/MEA relationship. It is narrow in scope and exclude the 
relationship of a WTO member but non-member to the MEA- the more likely 
scenario of a conflict. Time is taken up with debate over exactly what is included 
within these negotiations. 
One of the least satisfactory aspects has been that the negotiations are purely 
held within the WTO, which excludes more global olutions that may be more 
amenable to the WTO/MEA relationship. The solutions that have can only be 
considered would mean changing or amending the rules, most probably Article XX. 
This will result in a standoff between members of the WTO as they are divided on 
this issue. 
It is therefore necessary to look outside the WTO for a pos ible solution, 
which can provide clarification and ensure that environment is placed equally with 
trade within our international community. A new global regime would be the 
preferred option. It could bring together the environmental treatie under one roof 
and allow for environmental experts to share information to en ure that our 
environment is protected . A coordinated approach between the WTO and GEO 
cou Id head off potential problem between domestic trade and environmental policy 
before they occur. 
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However, it is unlikely that a GEO will evolve in the near future and so as an 
interim measure this paper has suggested that an Understanding or Declaration is 
formed which can guide countries when they are drafting trade measures or their 
own legislation. This approach will take into account the differences inherent in both 
the WTO and MEA systems that will allow them to work in their own ways without 
the fear that one would be superseded by the other. It will allow the continuation and 
development of MEAs without the fear of a conflict. 
What is evident from this research is that although the issue is simple enough the 
practical implications are complex. It is apparent that WTO rules cannot be 
interpreted in isolation of international law of which MEAs are an integral part. 
There is a need to develop further internationally agreed principles to guide the use 
of trade measures within the context of MEAs with the objective being to reconcile 
international environmental law and the multilateral trading system to avoid clashes 
between the two systems. 
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